Daron Acemoglu
Kamer Daron Acemoğlu (born September 3, 1967) is a Turkish-born American economist who has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) since 1993. He is currently the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at MIT. He was named Institute Professor in 2019. **Source**: [Daron Acemoglu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daron_Acemoglu) on Wikipedia.
Works (50)

Why Nations Fail

The Narrow Corridor

Introduction to modern economic growth

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

Macroeconomics

Emergence and persistence of inefficient states

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

Microeconomics

Competing engines of growth

A theory of military dictatorship

The consequences of radical reform

The form of property rights

Theory, general equilibrium and political economy in development economics

Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games

Aggregate comparative statics

Market size in innovation

Cross country inequality trends

Equilibrium bias of technology

The monopoly of violence

Labor- and capital-augmenting technical change

Price and capacity competition

Coalition formation in political games

Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning

Economic and political inequality in development

Coalition formation in non-democracies

Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule

Capital deepening and non-balanced economic growth

Technology, information and the decentralization of the firm

The Economics of labor coercion

Advances in Economics and Econometrics 3 Volume Paperback Set

Economic and political inequality in development

The rise of Europe

State-dependent intellectual property rights policy

Dynamics and stability of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

Markets versus governments

Experimentation, patents, and innovation

Unbundling institutions

Productivity differences between and within countries

Advances in Economics and Econometrics

Economic and political inequality in development

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

Economic backwardness in political perspective

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

Competition and efficiency in congested markets

Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis

Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games

Modeling inefficient institutions

Competition and efficiency in congested markets

Distance to frontier, selection, and economic growth