Roderick Chisholm

Person · Open Library

Works

3

via Open Library + Wikidata

Music · MusicBrainz

Type

Group

via MusicBrainz · CC0

Recent publications · Crossref

5 total works indexed

1. Global burden of 369 diseases and injuries in 204 countries and territories, 1990–2019: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019

   · 2020 · cited 15,964x

2. Global, regional, and national incidence, prevalence, and years lived with disability for 354 diseases and injuries for 195 countries and territories, 1990–2017: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017

   · 2018 · cited 10,997x

3. Global and regional mortality from 235 causes of death for 20 age groups in 1990 and 2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010

   · 2012 · cited 10,801x

4. An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution

   · 1999 · cited 10,214x

5. <i>Mercury CSD 2.0</i>– new features for the visualization and investigation of crystal structures

   · 2008 · cited 8,407x

via Crossref · CC0

Quotes

• “What we have been saying, of course, is not likely to convince the skeptics and we can hardly claim to have "refuted" them. But our question was not, "Can we refute the skeptics?" Our question was: "Are there positive reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of succeeding in the epistemic enterprise?" The answer seems to be that there are no such reasons. And therefore it is not unreasonable for us to continue.”
• “In making their assumptions, epistemologists presuppose that they are rational, beings. This means, in part, that they have certain properties which are such that, if they ask themselves, with respect to any one of these properties, whether or not they have that property, then it will be evident to them that they have it. It means further that they are able to know what they think and believe and that they can recognize inconsistencies.”
• “It is sometimes said that playing it safe is always more reasonable than taking any chances. And this would seem to be the attitude of the Pyrrhonist with respect to what it is reasonable for us to believe. But the following principle is "anti-Pyrrhonian":(A3) If the conjunction p&q is beyond reasonable doubt for S, then believing p&q is more justified for S than believing p while withholding q”
• “Our second "anti-Pyrrhonian" principle is this:(A4) If anything is probable for S, then something is certain for S”
• “The objectivity principle tells us what kind of justification we can have for beliefs about justification:(A5) If S knows that p, then, if S believes that he knows that p, then S knows that he knows that p”
• “It is true, of course, that most of us have very little knowledge of our psychological makeup and that we are likely to accept oversimplified and false accounts of why it is we think and act as we do. But this fact is quite consistent with what we have said about self-presenting properties. For, although these properties may mislead us about other things, they are not a source of error about themselves.”

via Wikiquote · CC BY-SA